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KATHRYN COLLARD, TRUSTEE 
of the LeRoy Collard Trust, 
Counterclaim Defendant-
Appellee. 
Case No. 20000976-CA 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On page 2 of Appellee's Brief, and elsewhere throughout the brief, Appellee 
("Collard") has stated that Mr. Collard "assumed" the Nagles' mortgage loan. While 
payments were made on the loan by Collard, there never was an assumption of that loan. 
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An assumption requires, at the very least, that Collard become legally obligated to the bank 
for the payment of that loan [See Black's Law Dictionary under "Assumption" and 
"Assumption of Indebtedness"] and may require an application by the assuming party to the 
lender for approval of the assumption [See §57-15-8, U.C.A.]. That was not done at any 
time. 
On pages 2 and 3 of Collard's brief, it is stated that Nagle "continued to accept 
direct payments on the mortgage to FSB." There was no acceptance by Nagle of those 
payments. They were made directly to the bank on behalf of Nagle while Nagle waited for 
Collard to perform under the contract by payment of the balance of the purchase price and 
by assumption of the loan. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
Collard admits that the lower court held that the statute of limitations barred 
both parties' legal claims and requested briefing on the issue of whether the court had 
equitable power to grant relief to Collard. However, Collard then states on page 4 of her 
brief that the lower court "modified its previous ruling." There is no indication in the court's 
decision that it modified its previous ruling. It simply ignored its previous ruling and decided 
it had equitable power to grant relief to Collard without also doing equity to Nagle. 
Collard further states, on page 4 of her brief, that the lower court also held that 
Nagle's claims "all failed on the merits, or were waived and/or barred." There was no 
determination on the merits of this case. The court simply decided that the statute of 
limitations barred the claims. 
2 
CORRECTION TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On page 5 of her brief, Collard states that she "disputed the factual allegations 
contained in paragraphs 7, 8, 9-11 of the Nagles' 'Statement of Facts' regarding the value 
of the 55,000 shares of stock conveyed by Mr. Collard." That, of course, raised an issue of 
fact which precluded the lower court from granting a summary judgment. However, since 
the lower court nevertheless granted summary judgment to Collard, Nagle's statement of 
those facts must be accepted as true in reviewing that judgment. Winegar v. Froerer, 813 
P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991) [On a motion for summary judgment, the court must accept all 
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the losing party]. The lower court 
declined to make a finding as to those facts because, on a motion for summary judgment, 
it cannot make findings as to disputed facts, not, as Collard Claims, because it held that 
Nagle's claims failed as a matter of law. 
In paragraphs 4-8 on pages 5 and 6 of her brief, Collard attempts to sever the 
contract into three separate parts by calling the various parts of the purchase price 
installments. Despite this attempt, the contract remains one unseverable contract and the 
full amount of the purchase price must be paid before a deed is due under the contract. 
In paragraph 8 on page 6 of her brief, Collard states that Mr. Collard tendered 
55,000 shares of stock in San Juan Mining and Developing Company "as required" by the 
contract. The fact is that the contract required delivery of 55,000 shares of Utah Coal and 
Chemical Company stock. The fact that San Juan Mining and Developing Company may 
have been a predecessor of Utah Coal and Chemical Company does not mean the shares 
of one are equivalent to the shares of the other. In any event the shares offered were not 
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worth the amount required by the contract and did not satisfy the requirement of the 
contract. 
In paragraph 19 on page 9 of her brief, Collard states that she wrote a letter with 
documentation demonstrating that the stock in question "could have been sold for the 
required $85,000.00 on any number of dates between its delivery and the letter of January 
13, 1981." While this statement is irrelevant because the lower court refused to make a 
finding on the value of the stock, since Nagle had submitted evidence to the contrary, the 
fact is that the letter from Collard only included information on the prices for the stock from 
January 1, 1979, through March of 1979 [See Exhibit A attached hereto], which was six 
months before the stock was delivered and Addendum #2 to the contract was signed. 
[Nagle Deposition, p. 30, lines 3-5; p. 41, lines 3-5; see Exhibit B attached hereto]. 
In paragraph 20 on page 10 of her brief, Collard asserts that the stock could 
have been sold for the $85,000. Nagle submitted evidence to the contrary and the lower 
court, on a motion for summary judgment, quite properly refused to make a finding on this 
disputed set of facts. Again, since the court ruled against Nagle, his view of the facts must 
be accepted as true in reviewing that decision. 
In paragraph 23 on page 10 of her brief, Collard states that Nagle retained the 
stock. That, too, is irrelevant since the stock was worthless and could not be sold [Nagle 
Deposition, p. 52, lines 6-10; see Exhibit B attached hereto] and, under the contract, it was 
Collard's obligation to make up the difference between the value of the stock and the 
$85,000.00. 
In paragraph 30 on page 12 of her brief, Collard states that Nagle's claims were 
based "solely on Mr. Collard's alleged breaches of the parties' Contract prior to January 25, 
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1981." The fact is that Nagle's claims were based upon Collard's continuing breach in having 
failed to pay the purchase price which was the condition precedent to delivery of the deed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT FOUND THAT COLLARD HAD NOT 
FULLY PERFORMED, DID NOT QUIET TITLE TO THE 
PROPERTY IN COLLARD AND ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARRED RECOVERY OF 
THE PURCHASE PRICE. 
1. Despite Collard's assertions to the contrary, the lower court concluded that 
Collard had not fully performed under the contract. 
Collard continues, throughout her brief, to misrepresent the lower court's ruling. 
On page 16, she again asserts that "the lower court correctly concluded tha t . . . Collard, had 
performed all of the actions or 'Installments' required for his receipt of the title to the 
Property . . ." This statement is simply not true. The lower court did not ever find or 
conclude that Collard had performed all of the requirements of the contract. The court did 
find that the down payment had been paid, which was not disputed, but the court expressly 
refused to make a finding with respect to the value of the stock delivered [Finding #15, 
Exhibit E, Addendum to Appellant's Brief] and thus could not and did not conclude that the 
$85,000 in value had been delivered. While the court did enter a conclusion that Nagle had 
waived the assumption requirement [Conclusion #8], it did so without any finding of fact to 
support that conclusion and without any evidence upon which such a finding could be based 
[See Appellant's Brief, Point II] and, in contradiction to that conclusion, it concluded that 
Collard's right to a deed had not arisen and was "conditioned upon payment of the 
remaining balance owed on the FSB Obligation." [Conclusions ##14 & 15, Exhibit E, 
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Addendum to Appellant's Brief]. That conclusion can only mean that Collard had not 
performed all the requirements of the contract, specifically the requirement to assume the 
FSB obligation. That conclusion also means that the requirement to assume the FSB 
obligation had not been waived because the court required that obligation to be paid by 
Collard as a condition to performance by Nagle. Payment in full of the FSB obligation is 
a greater requirement than assumption of that obligation but would obviously fulfill or 
replace the assumption requirement. 
The significance of that requirement by the lower court (to pay FSB as a 
condition to receipt of a deed) cannot be overemphasized. It represents a conclusion that 
the contract had not been fully performed, that the contract was still alive and subject to suit 
for non-performance, that the statute of limitations had not expired and that Collard was not 
entitled to a deed until the purchase price had been fully paid. Thus, the whole basis of the 
lower court's decision must crumble. The statute of limitations had not expired with respect 
to the enforcement of the contract by Nagle. 
Collard has argued, on page 17 of her brief, that the lower court's conclusion of 
waiver of the assumption requirement was based on "Nagles' own admissions." There is no 
such finding by the court and none of the references in that paragraph of her brief states 
that Nagle made any such admissions. Nagle, in fact, made no such admissions, the court 
made no such findings and, as pointed out above, the court's conclusion that delivery of a 
deed was conditioned upon payment of FSB is a conclusion that the assumption requirement 
was not waived. 
It is, therefore, obvious that the lower court did not find or conclude that Collard 
had performed all of the requirements of the contract. The court specifically did not find 
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that Collard had delivered the $85,000 in value and specifically concluded that the 
assumption requirement had not been met. Thus, Collard was in default and was not 
entitled to receive a deed to the property. 
2. The lower court should not have considered the statute of limitations defense 
raised by Collard. 
Collard argues on pages 18-19 of her brief that Nagle waived any argument that 
the lower court erred in considering Collard's statute of limitations defense. Her stated 
reasons are without support. The fact that Nagle properly pleaded the statute of limitations 
in his Answer and Counterclaim does not excuse Collard from failing to properly plead the 
statute as required by Rule 9(h), U.R.C.P. She further asserts that no other statute of 
limitations could apply. That also is not an excuse for failing to comply with Rule 9(h). She 
asserts that Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 U.2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970), the 
case cited by Nagle, is distinguishable on this ground. She misreads that case, since it did 
not involve a claim for fraud as she asserts and there was only one possible statute of 
limitations that could apply in that case. Wasatch Mines further reversed the lower court's 
application of the inadequately pleaded statute of limitation even though that argument was 
not raised in the lower court (a fact which is clear from reading the entire opinion). Thus, 
Wasatch Mines is controlling in this case. The more recent case of Conder v. Hunt, 1 P.3d 
558, 563-4 (Utah App. 2000), followed Wasatch Mines in holding that the failure to properly 
plead the correct statute of limitations as required by Rule 9(h) is fatal to the assertion of 
that claim, even though not asserted in the lower court. Conder went on to refuse to 
consider other statutes of limitations that might apply since they were not properly pleaded. 
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3. The lower court could but did not modify its ruling that both parties were 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
It is not contested that the lower court could modify its earlier ruling that the 
statute of limitations barred both parties from relief. It is simply pointed out that the lower 
court did not modify its earlier ruling. No where in the record is there a statement by the 
court that it changed its mind or modified its earlier ruling. Of course, in preparing the 
findings and conclusions, Collard omitted the court's ruling against it on this point but it is 
significant that Collard did not include a statement that the court had modified that ruling. 
In fact, the court did not change its mind. It had asked the parties to find an equitable 
ground upon which it could order a deed to be delivered to Collard. After the second 
hearing, it believed it had found such a ground and directed Collard to prepare findings and 
conclusions consistent with her argument. Her argument was that she was entitled to a deed 
as soon as she paid off the FSB obligation. That required the court to order specific 
performance of the contract by Nagle, that is, to deliver a deed, which is an equitable 
remedy. However, the court failed to require equity on Collard's side by paying the 
purchase price. The determination that Collard was entitled to a deed after she paid the 
FSB obligation meant that the contract was still in force. If the contract was still in force, 
the whole contract was in force and could not be severed. 
4. The lower court did not quiet title in Collard and she did not establish the 
elements necessary to quiet title. Thus, the claim that she was not barred by the 
statute of limitations is not applicable. 
Collard argues, on pages 20-21 of her brief, that she is not barred by the statute 
of limitations because, she asserts, the statute of limitations does not bar one in possession 
of property from seeking to quiet title. She relies on Conder v. Hunt, supra, to support that 
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argument. In fact, Conder v. Hunt at 564, states that "no Utah case cited by the parties 
specifically adopts this rule . . . [and] a definitive ruling on the question must await a case 
in which it is more squarely in issue." Thus, Collard's reliance on that case is misplaced. 
However, a glance at the judgment in this case demonstrates that the lower court did not 
quiet title in Collard but rather ordered specific performance of the contract by ordering 
delivery of a deed. While that judgment lacks support, for reasons set forth in Appellant's 
Brief and elsewhere herein, there was no basis for a quiet title judgment in favor of Collard 
in this matter. One who seeks to quiet title must prevail on the strength of his own title and 
not on the weakness of the other party's title. Music Service Corp. v. Walton, 20 U.2d 16, 
432 P.2d 334, 337-8 (Utah 1967) [A case in which the Supreme Court remanded for further 
proceedings since neither party had established a right to quiet title]. Church v. Meadow 
Springs Ranch Corp., Inc., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048-9 (Utah 1983) ['To succeed in an action to 
quiet title to real estate, a plaintiff must prevail on the strength of his own title and not on 
the weakness of a defendant's title or even its total lack of title."] Collard's only claim to 
title was pursuant to the contract which she sought to enforce. She did not prove any right, 
and the court did not grant quiet title, based on adverse possession, chain of title or any 
other ground. Nagle, on the other hand, held actual recorded title to the property, based 
on a chain of title of record, and no weakness in his title was demonstrated. A quiet title 
judgment for Collard could not have been entered. The judgment was simply an order to 
specifically perform a contract. Thus, the argument that one in possession of property is not 
barred by the statute of limitations from seeking to quiet title is not applicable. 
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5. Collard's argument that her "quiet title" claim had not accrued while Nagle's 
claims had expired contradicts her argument that Nagle waived the assumption 
requirement 
On page 21 of her brief, Collard asserts that her "quiet title" claim had not 
accrued yet. The first response to this is that her claim was not a quiet title claim but a 
claim for specific performance and the lower court so held. [See point 4, above]. Secondly, 
this argument contradicts her argument that Nagle waived the assumption requirement. The 
lower court required Collard to pay FSB in full as a condition to receipt of the deed. As 
set forth in point 1, above, this means that Collard had not fully performed and the contract 
was still subject to suit for non-performance. However, if, as Collard argues, Nagle had 
waived the assumption requirement in 1981, Collard had performed in 1981 (ignoring the 
requirement to pay $85,000 in value, which Collard also claims was due then and now 
barred) and was entitled to a deed in 1981. Therefore, Collard was barred after 1987 from 
pursuing a claim for the deed. [See pp. 22-23 of Appellant's Brief]. She cannot have it 
both ways. Either the assumption requirement was waived and she is barred by the statute 
of limitations or the whole unseverable contract is still in force and Nagle is not barred by 
the statute of limitations. The lower court's order of specific enforcement, an equitable 
remedy, is inequitable unless Collard is also required to do equity by payment of the 
purchase price. 
6. The pleading of an offset is not required since a counterclaim can be utilized 
as an offset Nagle's claims did coexist with Collard's claims. 
Collard claims, on page 22 of her brief, that the parties in the cases relied on by 
Nagle for the proposition that a counterclaim may be utilized as an offset actually pleaded 
offset while Nagle did not is not true. There is no indication in any of those cases that a 
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claim for an offset had been pleaded as an affirmative defense and there is no statement in 
any of those opinions that an offset must be pleaded as an affirmative defense. In fact, each 
of those cases state that a "defendant may therefore utilize a counterclaim, normally barred 
by the statute of limitations, to offset a plaintiffs claim," Coulon v. Coulgn, 915 P.2d 1069, 
1072 (Utah App. 1996), "the amount due Bunker on the Jacobsen note may be used as an 
offset against the amount owed Jacobsen," Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Utah 
1985), and a "if a defendant had a counterclaim that otherwise would have been barred by 
a statute of limitations, the counterclaim could be set-off against the plaintiffs claim," 
Jacobsen, at 1210, citing Salt Lake City v. Teluride Power Co., 82 Utah 607, 17 P.2d 281 
(Utah 1932). Thus, it is not necessary to separately plead offset as an affirmative defense 
because the pleading of a counterclaim is the pleading of an offset if the counterclaim is 
barred. 
Collard's assertion that the claims did not coexist is also false. Again, if her 
argument that the assumption requirement was waived in 1981 is accepted, her claim for 
specific performance arose in 1981 while Nagle's claim were, admittedly, still alive. 
Furthermore, this argument assumes she can sever this nonseverable contract into three 
parts in order to apply the statute of limitations to each part separately. It further ignores 
the fact that payment of the purchase price was a condition precedent to delivery of the 
deed and that delivery of the deed was a promise dependent on payment of the purchase 
price. [See pages 16-21 of Appellant's Brief]. Collard has apparently agreed with those 
positions since she has not countered them any where in her brief. Since she had not paid 
the purchase price, the claim for the purchase price was still alive and coexisted with her 
11 
claim for a deed. Moreover, her position ignores an important policy issue, as stated in 
Coulon, at 1073: 
This result is consistent with the policy prohibiting a plaintiff from 
delaying an action until after a defendant's counterclaim is barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
This policy is more fully stated in Moffitt v. Barr. 837 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah App. 1992): 
[AJppellees' interpretation penalizes "reluctant" litigants, i.e., those 
who would rather avoid litigation than assert the claims they possess, 
and who take the basically non-litigious position that they will assert 
their claims only if the other party brings litigation to fruition by 
filing a complaint against them, their real preference being to stay 
out of court altogether. . . . If a party files a complaint against a 
reluctant litigant, the reluctant litigant may then assert his or her own 
right to relief in the form of a counterclaim. 
Nagle's claims clearly coexisted with Collard's claims and he was a reluctant 
litigant because he knew that when Collard wanted a deed, he would have to pay the 
purchase price. The above policy justifies his "wait and see" attitude. 
7. Collard's arguments that Nagle's claims were barred are contradictory and 
rely upon cases involving earnest money agreements and not Uniform Real 
Estate Contracts. 
On pages 23-25 of her brief, Collard states that Nagle sent a letter to Collard in 
1981 that his default "will result in the institution of legal proceedings against you for 
foreclosure of the contract as a note and mortgage." She then argues that this letter did not 
satisfy the "strict notice and procedural requirements to effect a forfeiture under the 
Contract or Utah law." She ignores the fact that foreclosure and forfeiture are very different 
procedures under Uniform Real Estate Contracts and that if a party attempts and fails at 
one procedure, he could start over and elect another procedure as long as the default still 
exists. She cites McMullin v. Shimmin, 10 U.2d 142, 349 P.2d 720 (Utah 1960), for the 
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proposition that the election of forfeiture is exclusive and precludes recovery of any other 
damages under the contract or at law. McMullin, and the other authorities she cites, involve 
an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, which contains a clause giving the seller 
the option to retain the earnest money as liquidated and agreed damages if the buyer fails 
to close the sale. Thus, by retaining the earnest money, the seller has elected his remedy 
and is barred from suing for specific performance or for actual damages. Those cases do 
not apply to situations where the sale has been closed and a final Uniform Real Estate 
Contract has been signed, as is the case here, and the buyer has partially performed but fails 
to pay some portion of the purchase price. Those Uniform Real Estate Contracts expressly 
allow the seller alternative remedies, one of which is forfeiture and another of which is 
foreclosure of the contract as a note and mortgage. Neither forfeiture nor foreclosure 
requires the seller to refund the down payment and a failure to properly effect a forfeiture 
does not preclude the seller from later pursuing foreclosure if a default still persists. 
Collard claims that Nagle's attempt to effect a forfeiture failed. Nagle could. 
therefore, have abandoned that remedy for the time being and later properly pursued a 
forfeiture by following the strict requirements or he could have given notice of his intent to 
foreclose the contract. Or, if he assumed that the forfeiture remedy was effective (since it 
was not challenged at the time) and Collard became a tenant at will in the property, Nagle 
could allow Collard to remain in the property as a tenant at will with the right to evict him 
at any point in time. Collard's payment of the mortgage payments could have been 
considered the payment of rent as a tenant. It could also be argued that Collard's claim that 
forfeiture was not effective was barred by the statute of limitations since he took no action 
within six years of the forfeiture in 1981. None of these issues was considered by the lower 
13 
court since it's only holding was that Nagle was barred by the statute of limitations from 
asserting any of his claims. That holding is the issue that is challenged on this appeal. 
POINT II 
NAGLE'S CLAIMS OF FAILURE TO PAY THE PURCHASE 
PRICE, CONDITION PRECEDENT, NON-SEVERABLE 
CONTRACT AND DEPENDENT PROMISES WERE ALL 
PROPERLY PLEADED AND RAISED BELOW AND COLLARD 
HAD NOTICE OF THEM. 
Collard relies upon Rules 8(c) and 9(c), U.R.C.P., to argue that Nagle waived 
its claims of failure to pay the purchase price, condition precedent and dependent promises. 
She ignores the provisions of those rules which provide: 
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim 
or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper 
designation. [Rule 8(c)]. 
In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, 
it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have 
been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or 
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and 
when so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence 
shall on the trial establish the facts showing such performance or 
occurrence. [Rule 9(c)]. 
In paragraph 18 of Collard's complaint, she alleges that "Collard or his successors have 
tendered all sums due and owing under the Contract to Defendants and have otherwise 
performed all required acts under the Contract" [R. 3] and, in paragraph 35 of her 
complaint, she alleges that "Plaintiffs are entitled to a Declaratory Judgment by this Court 
finding that Collard and Plaintiff have fulfilled all of the Buyer's obligations under the 
Contract." [R. 5]. In Nagle's Answer and Counterclaim, he not only denies those allegations 
in paragraphs 13 and 23 of his Answer [R. 26 & 27], but he affirmatively alleges in his 
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Counterclaim [See R. 31-33] the condition precedent in paragraph 21 by quoting from 
Addendum #2 in full, including that buyer shall 
bring the total value conveyed to seller to $85,000 before seller 
conveys title to premises sold to buyer. 
He affirmatively alleges in paragraph 25: 
Collard never tendered sufficient Stock and/or cash to Nagle so as 
to enable Nagle to realize $85,000. 
He affirmatively alleges in paragraph 29: 
Nagle retained the legal title to the Property as security for Collard's 
obligations and, under the Contract, he had no obligation to deliver 
title to Collard unless and until Collard fully performed his 
obligations thereunder. 
He affirmatively alleges in paragraph 30: 
Nagle reasoned that because he held legal title to the Property to 
secure Collard's obligations under the Contract, he could simply wait 
and eventually, if Collard wanted to obtain legal title, Collard would 
have to make good on his obligations and deliver $85,000 worth of 
Stock and/or cash to him. 
He affirmatively alleges in paragraph 31: 
Thus, Nagle chose not to exercise any of his default remedies under 
the Contract, satisfied to allow Collard to continue making the 
monthly payments to First Security Bank, thus benefitting Nagle by 
increasing his equity in the Property and decreasing his personal 
liability on the mortgage, knowing that eventually Collard would have 
to make good on his obligations if he wanted title to the Property. 
Those are specific and particular denials of performance, as required by Rule 9(c), and they 
make specific reference to the provisions of the contract where the condition precedent is 
set forth. And, since they are set forth in the Counterclaim, they satisfy the requirements 
of Rule 8(c). There is no requirement that the words "condition precedent" be used. 
Further, the law with respect to dependent promises is a rule of law which applies to all 
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contracts and need not be specially pleaded. The burden was, therefore, on Collard to 
prove her allegations of performance. She failed to so prove and the lower court found that 
she had failed to perform. The condition precedent has not been performed and 
performance by Nagle is not yet due. 
POINT III 
WITH RESPECT TO THE CONCLUSION ON WAIVER OF 
THE ASSUMPTION REQUIREMENT, COLLARD 
MISUNDERSTANDS THE STANDARDS FOR FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Nagle's position on pages 21-23 of Appellant's Brief is simply that the lower 
court made no finding of fact which would support its conclusion of lav/ that Nagle waived 
the assumption requirement. Collard argues that there is evidence in the record to support 
that conclusion and that Nagle has failed to marshall the evidence to show that the findings 
of fact are clearly erroneous. Since there is no such finding of fact, there is no need to 
marshall evidence to support it. Further, the requirement of marshalling evidence does not 
apply on a motion for summary judgment since the lower court has no business making 
findings of fact on disputed evidence. The facts must be totally without dispute in order to 
justify a summary judgment and if there is any dispute in the facts, they must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the losing party-Nagle, in this instance. Furthermore, the "clearly 
erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., only applies in "actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury . . . ." There was no trial upon the facts in this case. On a motion for 
summary judgment, the court could not "assess the totality of the circumstances to determine 
whether the relinquishment [of a known right] is clearly intended," as required by Soter's, 
Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings, 857 P.2d 935, 941 (Utah 1993). Whatever, facts may appear 
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in the record must be construed in the light most favorable to Nagle which means there was 
no intentional relinquishment of his right and no waiver of the assumption requirement. 
POINT IV 
THE DEFENSE OF LACHES WAS NOT ARGUED BELOW, 
WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE LOWER COURT AND IS 
HYPOCRITICALLY RAISED BY COLLARD HERE. 
Having just argued that a claim may not be raised for the first time on appeal, 
Collard then argues that laches applies even though it was not argued to the lower court and 
the lower court did not make any findings or conclusions with respect to laches. The cases 
generally hold that laches does not apply when the statute of limitations has not expired 
because, until then, the parties still have rights to enforce. Since the lower court's 
application of the statute of limitations is the substance of this appeal, laches does not apply. 
Collard relies on Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 
720, 731 (Utah 1990), to support it's laches argument. That case held that laches did not 
apply because the party asserting the defense had failed to perform its duty under the 
contract. For the same reason, it does not apply here. It is Collard who has failed to 
perform under the contract by failing to pay the purchase price. 
The argument that Nagle has simply been "sitting and waiting" for some 
"propitious event and then, when all risk is over, assert a claim" simply doesn't apply here. 
There has been no "propitious" event that prejudices Collard. Nagle has simply been waiting 
for Collard to pay the purchase price before he conveys title. That has not prejudiced 
Collard in any way. In fact, her whole argument is that, because Nagle has waited so long, 
it is he who is prejudiced because he cannot now assert his claim for payment of the 
purchase price. Collard's claims of prejudice are false. Though the original contract may 
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be lost, all parties have copies which have been submitted to the court and no claims of 
prejudice were made below. Furthermore, both parties have submitted evidence of trading 
history of the stock demonstrating that such evidence is available. And failing memories 
do not come into play here because the only issue is whether the stock was delivered and 
whether it had sufficient value to satisfy the contract. There is no question as to what stock 
was delivered and the value of the stock can be established by the trading history evidence 
which is available. That evidence shows that the stock has been worthless, or nearly so, from 
the time it was delivered until the present. There has been no prejudice to Collard by the 
passage of time. 
Collard's "sitting and waiting" argument is also contrary to the policy set forth in 
Coulon and Moffit, above, that encourages reluctant litigants to avoid litigation by waiting 
for the other party to first take action. This is especially true where Nagle is not obligated 
to deliver a deed until Collard has paid the purchase price. He was fully justified in waiting 
for Collard's performance. 
POINT V 
COLLARD IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Collard argues that she prevailed on her "preeminent quiet title claim" and is, 
therefore, entitled to attorney's fees. In addition to again misstating the lower court's 
holding, she fails to cite any authority that would grant attorney's fees in a quiet title action. 
In fact, there is no contract or statutory basis for fees in such a case. 
She also ignores the lower court's basis for its ruling and for its refusal to award 
attorney's fees. The lower court found no legal basis on which it could grant relief to either 
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party and asked the parties to brief the court on whether an equitable ground existed to 
require a deed to be delivered to Collard. Since the court was no longer construing the 
contract but was acting in equity to grant some remedy to Collard, it concluded that there 
was no legal basis on which Collard was entitled to attorney's fees and that it would be 
inequitable to award such fees. That, incidentally, was the only equity the court granted to 
Nagle, having refused to require that Collard pay the purchase price, which would have 
constituted true equity in this case. 
In addition, since the lower court held that Collard was not entitled to a deed 
until after she paid off the FSB obligation, which was not done until after conclusion of the 
action, it was obvious that Collard's suit was premature and no fees were deserved. The 
court did not conclude that Nagle had breached the contract which would be a necessary 
basis for an award of fees under the contract. Under the circumstances, the court's refusal 
to award fees was amply justified. 
Furthermore, even if an award of fees could be justified under the contract, such 
an award could only be made against a party to the contract. Nagle Construction Company, 
Inc. is the seller under the contract. Gary M. Nagle, as an individual, has not taken an 
assignment of the contract and has not assumed any of the obligations of the contract. 
There is, therefore, no contractual basis for an award of fees against him. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in this case must be reversed because the lower court erred in 
applying the law with respect to the statute of limitations. It should not have considered the 
statute which Collard failed to plead as required by the rules. If the statute applies to Nagle, 
it also applies to Collard, as the court concluded. The court granted an equitable remedy 
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to Collard without requiring that she do equity by paying the full purchase price. Nagle's 
counterclaim, even if barred, may still be used as an offset against Collard's claim for title, 
thus requiring the consideration for the deed to be paid. Payment of the purchase price was 
a condition precedent to delivery of the deed and those dependent covenants may not be 
severed to force compliance with one without reciprocal compliance with the other. 
The lower court concluded that Collard had not fully performed and did not 
quiet title in Collard. It erred in applying the statue of limitations to a claim that Collard 
had not yet performed. 
Nagle's claims were all properly pleaded and raised below and Collard cannot 
claim surprise with respect to any one of them. The court's conclusion that the statute of 
limitations applied simply made its consideration, in its mind, of those claims unnecessary. 
The court's conclusion that Nagle waived the assumption requirement was 
without a supporting finding and without supporting evidence. There is no evidence on this 
issue and on a motion for summary judgment all material facts must be without dispute and 
all facts and inferences must be considered in a light most favorable to the losing party. 
The laches argument was not raised and considered below and does not apply 
because of Collard's default and Collard is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
The lower court's decision in this case must be reversed. 
DATED this j £ f day of January, 2002. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A Kathryn Collard Letter of January 23,1981 
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Mr. W. Waldan Lloyd 
Jensen & Lloyd 
870 Commercial Security Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
RE: Roy Collard/ Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
March 30, 1978 
Dear Mr. Lloyd, 
I have enclosed for your information the 
Wilson-Davis stock quotation sheets showing the selling 
price of Utah Coal & Chemicals Corp, stock subsequent to 
the date of the real estat'e contract. These summary sheets 
show the number of dates from January 1, 1979 through 
March of 1979, when the stock in question could have been 
sold for the profit of $85,000.00 referred to in the 
contract• 
I appreciate your attention to this matter. 
Yours, Vei^^Truly, 






Q And do you recall when that agreement was 
entered into? 
A I think it was in September of '79. 
Q Right about the time that you got the San 
Juan stock? 
A That's right. 
Q Was there anywhere in Addendum 2 that 
explains, the way you read it, or from your under-
standing, that in addition to the realization of 
$85,000 that he would also pay off the First Security 
loan? 
A That's our understanding, yes. 
Q Okay. My question was -- I know that's 
your understanding. The question is: Is there 
anything in Addendum 2 that you can show me that 
talks about the payoff of the First Security loan? 
A It says we'll get $85,000 in cash. It 
doesn't say it'll pay the loan out with it. 
Q So is it your testimony that Addendum 2 
replaced Addendum 1 or was in addition to Addendum 1? 
A Well, it replaces it, I believe. 
MR. LARSEN: You can see on page 1 of 
Exhibit 1 in paragraph 6 it refers to the loan. So 
WENDY S. ALCOCK - DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188 
Q Had it expired by a long time, short 
time, do you remember either way? 
A The two documents speak for themselves. 
If this was in September when we got the stock and 
registered it, that was September of '79, this is 
January of '81, so that's more than a year. 
Q Did you read that letter before it was 
sent to Mr. Collard? 
A I assume so. 
Q I assume if it was sent out, it was with 
your approval? 
A Yes . 
Q The letter states on paragraph -- last 
paragraph of the letter, that Mr. Collard's failure 
to deliver the stock would be "deemed by Nagle 
Construction to be a breach of the contract and a 
default thereunder." Is that what the letter says? 
A That's what it says. 
Q So it was your position, wasn't it, that 
as of January 25th, the deadline, unless the money or 
additional stock was delivered, that you considered 
the contract to be in default? 
A Yes . 
Q And at that time, as of January 25th, 
1981, did you in fact believe that Mr. Collard had 
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Q What about Wilson-Davis Securities? 
A I don't know who that is. 
Q Have you been able to find out -- going 
back and looking at what the trading values of these 
two stocks were during this period of time? 
A Well, I can tell you this, that in 1979, 
from there on, it was just downhill. I don't think 
they ever became worth anything. And there was no 
market for them. I couldn't get anybody to buy them, 
that I knew of. 
Q Do you have any documents or any computer 
programs that you've been able to find the value of 
these stocks as of, say, between --
A I don't. 
Q -- the date in 1970 and 1980? 
A I do not. 
Q And in the preceding 20 years, Nagle 
Construction has gone out of business? 
A Yes . 
Q And apparently the original contract has 
been lost, or at least is not here yet? 
A It's not here. 
Q And in the intervening 20 years, Collard 
and his family have continued making payments on the 
First Security loan; correct? As far as you know? 
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